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Emotional Expressions Support the Communication of Social Groups: A Pragmatic Extension of 
Affective Pragmatics 
 Expanding on linguistic frameworks for how speakers use speech acts to convey a variety 
of distinct meanings that are unachievable through words’ denotations alone, Scarantino 
proposes the Theory of Affective Pragmatics (TAP) as a means to explain what signalers do with 
their emotions to nonverbally convey nuance in meaning. The central tenets of TAP are that 
emotional expressions express more than just emotions, and that these expressions function as 
Speech Act Analogs. Yet, as he suggests in his conclusion, TAP should extend to other 
nonlinguistic forms of communication as well. This proposition is reminiscent of past efforts by 
other scholars; such as Birdwhistell’s (1970) attempts to establish a nonverbal grammar. Yet, 
unlike those efforts, Scarantino succeeds by limiting his focus to emotional expressions, which 
might lay a foundation that serves as a common ingredient present throughout other various 
forms of communication. Here, we contend that the seeds for this may already exist in how 
people use information in emotional expressions to categorize social groups. 
Social Groups Signaled by Facial Emotion 
 Discerning the groups to which another person belongs constitutes one of the most basic 
social psychological acts that people perform. This process of social categorization often occurs 
instantly upon perceiving a person, frequently outside of conscious awareness (e.g., see Macrae 
& Quadflieg, 2010, for review). Its rapidity, ease, and frequent accuracy suggest that it is a basic 
process, potentially unperturbed by the perception of ancillary and dynamic factors such as the 
perceived individual’s emotional expression. Yet, a growing body of research challenges this 
assumption, illustrating that emotions and social categories reciprocally exchange information in 
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mutual influence over the other, with emotions exerting particular influence when social 
categories are ambiguous. 
Perceptually Obvious Groups 
 To date, scholars have identified three basic category dimensions that seem to experience 
immediate processing upon perception: age, race, and sex (e.g., Brewer, 1988). These “big three” 
social categories arguably form a critical basis in person perception, privileging them in the 
processing of information about other people. Because of their centrality, one might expect the 
perception and categorization of these dimensions to be relatively fixed and immutable. Yet data 
show that perceptions of emotion can guide and sway how people categorize them.  
For instance, Hugenberg and Bodenhausen (2003) found that White perceivers high in 
implicit prejudice towards Black individuals more readily perceived Black faces than White 
faces as displaying anger, indicating a race-anger association. Building upon this finding, they 
later showed that angry expressions facilitated the categorization of racially ambiguous faces as 
Black among implicitly prejudiced perceivers (Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2004). Thus, facial 
expressions of anger communicated race for those perceivers who implicitly associated 
Blackness with anger. Further demonstrating the reciprocal influence of emotional expressions 
and social categories, Hutchings and Haddock (2008) found that perceivers rated angry racially 
ambiguous faces as appearing more intensely angry when they categorized those faces as Black 
than when they categorized the same faces as White—thus, the perceived intensity of the 
emotional expression varied as a function of the face’s perceived race. 
 Emotions also strongly interact with sex categorizations. Anger carries stereotypical 
associations with masculinity, whereas joy and fear relate to femininity (Birnbaum, Nosanchuk, 
& Croll, 1980; Briton & Hall, 1995). Furthermore, anger shares facial markers with 
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morphological cues to male gender, and both fear and happiness expressions share facial features 
with cues that mark female gender (Hess, Adams, Grammer, & Kleck, 2009; see also Adams, 
Hess, & Kleck, 2015). These overlaps in facial cues to emotion and gender consequently bias 
perception: People perceive androgynous angry faces as more likely to be male and androgynous 
fearful or happy faces as more likely to be female (Hess et al., 2009). Reciprocally, people rate 
neutral male faces as angrier, less fearful, and less happy than neutral female faces (Adams, 
Nelson, Soto, Hess, & Kleck, 2012). Gender-emotion stereotypes thus lead to an exchange of 
information about how a person is feeling and what his or her sex might be.  
Perceptually Ambiguous Groups 
Given that even highly discernible social categories like race and sex can show 
susceptibility to the influence of emotional expression, it is perhaps not surprising that emotions 
play a role in the perception of groups that are largely perceptually ambiguous. For example, the 
stereotypical associations that link particular emotions to masculinity and femininity in 
impressions of gender also extend to perceptions of sexual orientation. Specifically, consistent 
with stereotypes of gay men as feminine and straight men as masculine, people accordingly 
expect gay men to express happiness and expect straight men to express anger (Tskhay & Rule, 
2015). Interestingly, Tskhay and Rule (2015) found that people associate happiness with gay 
men and anger with straight men even when perceptions of men’s femininity and masculinity are 
statistically controlled. This suggests a direct association between these emotions and sexual 
orientation distinct from the concepts of gender atypicality that usually characterize sexual 
orientation perception (e.g., Freeman, Johnson, Ambady, & Rule, 2010). Thus, people perceive 
more happiness in the faces of gay versus straight men (and more anger in the faces of straight 
vs. gay men) and mentally represent (or imagine) hypothetical gay and straight men as 
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expressing happiness and anger, respectively. People seem to know this association at some level 
and use it to communicate sexual orientation. When asked to communicate that they were gay, 
both gay and straight men enacted happy expressions; when asked to communicate that they 
were straight, both gay and straight men enacted relatively angry expressions. Moreover, these 
beliefs about the link between emotion and sexual orientation reflects at least a kernel of truth, as 
an analysis of naturalistic photos (i.e., photos not taken in the lab) showed that gay men 
expressed more happiness than straight men did. 
Not only can facial expressions of happiness and anger serve as valid signals to sexual 
orientation, they can provide information about political affiliation as well. Using tests parallel to 
those done with sexual orientation, Tskhay and Rule (2015) found that people’s mental 
representations of liberals looked happier whereas their mental representations of conservatives 
resembled anger. These associations also influence perceptions of actual liberals and 
conservatives (i.e., with happier-looking political candidates accurately categorized as liberal), 
and how people communicate political affiliation when asked to enact a liberal or conservative 
appearance. Facial expressions of emotion therefore factor into ideas about political affiliation 
and serve as utilized and veridical tools for communicating one’s political beliefs. 
 More recently, research has demonstrated an association between facial expressions of 
emotion and social class. Happiness relates to higher social class standing—both stereotypically 
and, to some degree, realistically (Aknin, Norton, & Dunn, 2009; Diener & Biswas-Diener, 
2002). Perceivers thus categorize faces displaying happier expressions as rich (Bjornsdottir & 
Rule, in press). Moreover, as the struggles of lower social class individuals typically invite 
negative affect, including depression (Haushofer & Fehr, 2014), perceivers accordingly tend to 
categorize faces with sad expressions as poor (Bjornsdottir & Rule, 2017). Most interesting, rich 
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people’s neutral faces look more positive than poor people’s neutral faces (Bjornsdottir & Rule, 
in press). This finding supports earlier work demonstrating that one’s life experiences can shape 
the development of static (i.e., neutral) facial structure (Adams, Garrido, Albohn, Hess, & Kleck, 
2016; Malatesta, Fiore, & Messina, 1987) and suggests that the associations between emotional 
expressions and social class possess some validity. 
Together, these accounts of overlap between emotion and both perceptually obvious and 
perceptually ambiguous social categories support TAP’s assertion that emotional expressions 
communicate more than just emotion. Yet, the evidence for its extent goes beyond that reviewed 
by Scarantino to include signals about social group memberships. The question of how this 
occurs still remains, however. As Scarantino outlines, emotional expressions are informative 
because of the natural information that they carry. That is, these expressions correlate with 
certain states (i.e., emotions). They also, however, correlate with particular group memberships 
because those emotions are associated with certain groups, either in reality or via stereotypes. 
When group memberships are ambiguous, such as when individuals are androgynous, mixed-
race, or belong to a group that is not perceptually obvious (as with sexual orientation, political 
affiliation, and social class), the natural information carried by facial expressions of emotion can 
facilitate perceivers’ social categorizations. Scarantino notes that natural information varies 
depending on the context. Indeed, context can likewise make certain emotion-group associations 
salient or relevant. For example, facial expressions of anger may signal gender or sexual 
orientation, depending on the context. Just as Scarantino describes the partially incongruent 
mapping of emotional expressions to emotions, there is also not a one-to-one mapping of 
emotional expressions to social groups. 
Speech Act Analogs of Social Group Signaling 
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 By signalling group membership through facial expressions of emotion, these facial 
expressions can correlate with certain social motives. This relation may not necessarily occur 
voluntarily, as in the case of neutral faces that nonetheless communicate membership in a group 
without an individual’s awareness or volition. Scarantino asserts that social motives belong to 
four general categories of communicative moves: Expressives, Imperatives, Declaratives, and 
Commissives, which every emotional expression performs jointly. Indeed, as signals of group 
membership, facial expressions of emotion both communicate an emotion and identify its 
associated group (an Expressive), elicit reactions from perceivers based both on the emotional 
state and the associated group membership (an Imperative), communicate possible elicitors of 
the emotion as well as the stereotypes associating them with certain social groups (a 
Declarative), and indicate the signaler’s likely behaviors based on his or her expressed emotion 
and associated group memberships (a Commissive). For example, in the context of a gay bar, an 
angry expression on a man’s face can signal anger or that he is heterosexual. That impression 
could elicit avoidance behavior from other men; make salient the association between anger, 
dominance, and traditional masculinity; and suggest that the signaler might engage in aggressive 
behavior.  
The communication of social group memberships via facial expressions of emotion can 
thus be considered Speech Act Analogs along the lines of those described in Scarantino’s TAP. 
As such, emotional expressions can convey information regarding the social groups with which 
they correlate, serving as analogs of verbal statements that describe (a) social group membership, 
(b) the reactions that a group may elicit, (c) the stereotypes associated with a group, and (d) the 
behaviors that one might expect from a particular group’s members. Thus, a straight man in a 
gay bar can simply enact an angry facial expression in place of verbally stating his sexual 
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orientation, asserting his desire for other men to avoid him, noting his traditionally masculine 
traits, and hinting at his potential propensity for aggression if approached. His emotional 
expression therefore communicates multiple potential pieces of information, functioning as 
effective nonverbal “speech acts” complete with the standard properties of implicature that 
govern traditionally verbal speech acts (see Thomas, 1995, for a review). 
Scarantino argues that emotional expressions, functioning as Speech Act Analogs, benefit 
both signalers and receivers—the information they convey both provides receivers with useful 
information and helps signalers meet their goals. This aligns with and builds upon existing 
theories of person perception and nonverbal behavior. The ecological theory of social perception, 
for instance, posits that perceivers adaptively extract useful information about others from the 
environment (e.g., emotional states, social group memberships; McArthur & Baron, 1983). 
Unsurprisingly, this comports well with Fridlund’s (1994) behavioral ecological view of 
emotions, with which TAP integrates and upon which it expands in asserting that emotional 
expressions benefit the signaler. As signals of social group membership, facial expressions of 
emotion indeed seem to benefit both the signaler and receiver. Knowledge of someone’s 
ambiguous group memberships is clearly useful to receivers, particularly as this indicates likely 
behaviors (functioning as a Commissive) and stereotypes (functioning as a Declarative). For the 
signaler, expressing one’s group membership via emotional facial expressions can be useful both 
simply to make a relevant membership known (i.e., an Expressive) and in order to elicit desired 
reactions (i.e., an Imperative). Returning to the example of the angry male face in the gay bar, 
this signal allows the signaler to communicate his heterosexuality and elicit avoidance from 
other men, and enables receivers in his context to anticipate what he may be like and how he 
may behave. Yet, it is also not a pure signal. The man could be an affectively neutral 
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heterosexual, whose physiognomy connotes anger (as per Hess et al., 2009; Tskhay & Rule, 
2015) or just an angry gay man. Further context and co-occurring pragmatic signals require 
disambiguation due to the overlaps in the emotional and categorical cues. As such, emotional 
expressions as category cues lack the same sophistication that Scarantino describes for nonverbal 
illocution more generally. 
Conclusion 
 Thus, although nonverbal “speech acts” pale in comparison to the precision offered by 
language, they provide sufficient informational richness to amply justify the parallels that 
Scarantino envisions in TAP. We therefore join him in his call for further elaboration of how 
pragmatic contributions via emotional expressions (and potentially other nonemotional 
nonverbal behaviors) might constitute meaningful signals and actions with communicative force. 
Here, we have briefly illustrated one potential extension, conveniently bridged by emotional 
expressions, that arguably does just that: the communication of social group membership. 
 Overall, TAP provides a useful framework for understanding how facial expressions of 
emotion can convey ambiguous social group memberships. Based on our research and that of 
others only scantly touched above, we agree with Scarantino that emotional expressions indeed 
provide information about more than just emotional states. They may, in some instances, 
represent complete communicative signals (as Scarantino has shown) and can help to convey or 
clarify the social groups to which an individual may belong. Facial expressions of emotion 
therefore function as Speech Act Analogs not only to emotion-relevant but also to group-related 
verbal expressions of one’s desires, one’s intentions, and one’s status in the social world.  
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